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ARE ENUMERATED CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS THE ONLY RIGHTS WE HAVE?
THE CASE OF ASSOCIATIONAL
FREEDOM
RANDY E. BARNET*
Much of contemporary constitutional thought assumes that
the only rights individuals have are either those that they are
given by the legislature or those that are explicitly specified in
the Constitution of the United States (or in a state constitu-
tion). Such a view of rights is based on the jurisprudential phi-
losophy known as legal positivism, a view that has dominated
academic discussions about legal rights for at least fifty years
and that has begun to wane only in the last fifteen years.' In
this Paper, I will try to explain how adherence to this legal posi-
tivism taints and distorts constitutional discussions in general
and discussions of associational freedom in particular.
I. LEGAL PosrrIvIsM AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Legal positivism specifies that the only legal rights one has
are those that are recognized by the sovereign legal authority.
According to legal positivism, while one may appropriately
claim that a sovereign legal authority ought to recognize a right,
unless and until such a right is in fact recognized, one cannot
say that an individual has such a right.2 In other words, legal
positivism represents the proposition that "first comes govern-
ment, then come individual rights."
This jurisprudential position influences constitutional analy-
sis in the following manner. If the exclusive source of law is the
sovereign and if, as in the United States, the sovereign is
thought to be the popularly elected legislature, then, unless the
* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law. B.A. Northwestern University, 1974;J.D. Harvard Law School, 1977. 1 am
grateful to my colleagues Lewis Collens, Linda Hirshman, Dan A. Tarlock, and Richard
Wright for their most helpful comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank
Brian J. Brille for his research assistance.
1. See Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book Re-
view), 97 HARv. L. REV. 1223 (1984) (tracing the recent decline of legal positivism and
the rise of normative rights-based legal philosophy).
2. A good introductory discussion of legal positivism can be found inJ. MURPHY &J.
COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 22-38 (1984).
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legislature grants a right to an individual, that right does not
exist. Admittedly, in the United States, this "legislative
supremacy" is qualified by a constitutional framework that
places judicially enforced limits on what legislatures may per-
missibly do; but the Constitution itself can be seen as nothing
more than the enactment of the sovereign body known as the
Constitutional Convention (as ratified by the states).
Viewed from a positivist perspective, then, judges are the
"lieutenants" of the sovereign. Judges, in the United States, are
authorized to recognize only such rights as are generated by a
popularly elected legislature or by a written constitution, for
these two institutions are the exclusive sources of all rights. A
judge may never restrict the acts of a duly elected legislature
unless such a restriction is specifically authorized by the Consti-
tution. A judge is authorized to enforce only those strictures
that are actually written in the Constitution (and those that may
fairly be implied). Let us call this "government first-rights sec-
ond" account of the relationship between individual rights and
the Constitution the "Austinian" approach to the Constitution,
after John Austin, the father of legal positivism.3
II. NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE "HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION"
The Austinian approach to the Constitution is so well estab-
lished that the older view of law and rights, which may be con-
trasted with the legal positivist view of the Constitution, might
today be inconceivable to some. Before the development of
positivism, however, scholars began, rather than concluded,
their political and legal analysis with the proposistion that indi-
viduals had rights, often referred to as natural rights. John
Locke was one of these thinkers. Thomas Paine was another.
The theory asserted that in a "state of nature," that is, in a
society where there is no government, "all men may be re-
strained from invading other's rights, and from doing hurt to
one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth
the peace and preservation of all mankind . . . ."I Putting
Locke's point in more modern terms-Robert Nozick's terms
to be precise-we might say that according to a Lockean polit-
3. See UrmsonJohn Austin, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 209 (P. Edwards ed.
1967).
4. J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Civil Government § 7, in Two TREATISES ON GOVERN-
MENT 316 (Mentor ed. 1960) (London 1690).
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ical and moral analysis: "Individuals have rights, and there are
things no person or group may do to them (without violating
their rights)." 5
Where does government and law come in? Locke argues:
[C]ivil government is the proper remedy for the incofive-
niences of the state of Nature, which must certainly be great
where men may be judges in their own case, since it is to be
imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an
injury will scarcely be so just as to condemn himself for it.6
In short, government is created because it is convenient. It
solves some difficult practical problems of enforcing one's nat-
ural rights. Government is not seen as the source of rights, but
rather the legal protection of pre-existing rights is seen as the
reason why a government is created. Accordingly, not just any
government will do, for as Locke observed:
[I]f government is to be the remedy of those evils which nec-
essarily follow from men being judges in their own cases,
and the state of Nature is not to be endured, I desire to know
what kind of government that is, and how much better it is
than the state of Nature .... 7
In other words, if government is a cure for some malady involv-
ing the legal protection of individual rights, it must be a cure
that is better than the disease. The standard for assessing the
performance of government is its efficacy in enforcing the pre-
existing rights of individuals. Government is created to provide
substantive due process of law and must be assessed by this
standard. According to this view, then, individual rights come
first and government, with all its various "branches" and fed-
eral-state "separations," comes second as a means of securing
these fundamental rights.
To some, this view of law and rights and government may
appear to be nothing more than ancient philosophy. Fascinat-
ing though such intellectual history might be, what could it
possibly have to do with contemporary constitutional jurispru-
dence, much less with freedom of association?
The connection lies in the fact that the authors of our Consti-
tution were very much influenced by the Lockean philosophy of
"rights first-government second." The Founders saw that the
5. R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA iX (1974).
6. J. LOCKE, supra note 4, § 13, at 316.
7. Id.
Barnett
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
creation of government requires constitutional limits on the
power of government. The constitutional limitations they im-
posed on the three branches of the government-including the
legislative branch-were imposed to protect the natural rights
of all persons who comprise the society. At least that was the
intent of the Framers.8
Judge Bork has recently and wisely admonished us that
"judges have no mandate to govern in the name of con-
tractarian or utilitarian or what-have-you philosophy rather
than according to the historical Constitution."9 The proper
connection between natural rights and constitutional analysis is
that the "historical Constitution" that judges are called upon to
interpret may be seen most accurately as a product of Lockean
philosophy. Even if a contemporary analyst did not believe in
natural rights, for the Constitution to be given its historically
proper construction, such rights must be hypothesized and as-
sumed to exist.
From the point of view of "original intent," viewing the Con-
stitution and the legislature as the sole sources of individual
rights is actually quite anachronistic. Interpreting the Constitu-
tion from a legal positivist or Austinian perspective of "govern-
ment first-rights second" is to treat the Eighteenth-Century
Constitution as a product of Nineteenth-Century philosophy.
John Austin did not deliver his path-breaking lectures in juris-
prudence until 1826,10 and they were first published in 1832,11
some forty years after the Constitution of the United States was
adopted.
III. THE DECLINE OF NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE
"HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION" AND THE RISE
OF THE WELFARE STATE
Until the mid-1970s, the Austinian Constitution and the
"government first-rights second" view dominated constitu-
tional thought. What accounts for the almost complete eclipse
of the "rights first-government second" philosophy of John
Locke and the historical Constitution? This question defies a
8. See, e.g., J. STORING, WHAT THE ANIT-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981) (concisely
describing the views of the proponents and opponents of the Constitution).
9. R. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTONAL LAW 7 (1984).
10. See Urmson, supra note 3, at 209.
11. Id.
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simple explanation, but at least three factors contributed im-
portantly to the decline of the Lockean approach.
The first blow to the Lockean world-view was the acceptance
of Austinian legal positivism by American legal intellectuals as
part of the empiricist movement that swept all branches of
academia in the Nineteenth Century. Empiricism has been de-
fined as "the theory that experience rather than reason is the
source of knowledge."' 2 According to this view, if you cannot
see it, feel it, or measure it, it is not real. The most palpable
aspect of law is enforcement. To an empiricist, all talk about
natural law is "nonsense" and talk about natural rights is "non-
sense on stilts," to use Jeremy Bentham's colorful phrase. 3
No one exemplifies this approach to legal analysis better
than Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. His famous statement that
"the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence"' 4 captures perfectly his empiricist orientation. Conse-
quently, Justice Holmes lampooned notions of substantive due
process based on pre-existing individual rights as positing "a
brooding omnipresence in the sky."' 15 In Lochner v. New York '"
he dismissed the Court's Lockean reasoning with a phrase that
became the rallying cry for Twentieth Century constitutional
law: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics."' 17
Even for Holmes-the master ofjudicial catch phrases- this
putdown was brilliant. By making it appear to be a product of
Herbert Spencer's popular, liberal Nineteenth Century work,
Justice Holmes deprived the Court's analysis of its actual his-
torical legitimacy. Reasoning that was firmly based on the Lock-
ean philosophy that preceded and produced the American
Revolution and Constitution was recast and dismissed as a
wholly extraneous and "ideological" gloss on the document. In
the guise of philosophical neutrality, Justice Holmes success-
fully paved the way for a more "modem" constitutional analy-
12. Hamlyn, Empiricism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 499 (P. Edwards ed.
1967).
13. J. BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (A. Meldon ed. 1970)
("Natural rights is simple nonsense; natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical non-
sense-nonsense upon stilts. But this rhetorical nonsense ends in the old strain of mis-
chievous nonsense .... So much for terrorist language.").
14. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
15. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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sis based on the essentially utilitarian18 Nineteenth Century
Austinian legal philosophy favored by him and others.
The second blow to the Lockean "historical Constitution"
was the Great Depression. A general perception existed that
this tragic event was a product of the failure of classical liberal
principles or, at the very least, that to deal efficiently with this
catastrophe required a scuttling of liberal principles. As the
Japanese detention cases illustrate,'" we cannot underestimate
the effect that general fear and perceptions of exigency may
have on constitutional jurisprudence.
Finally, the Lockean rights of private property and freedom
of contract had been inconsistently protected by the Court.
This made the constitutional basis of these rights appear less
intellectually compelling and easier to reverse.2 ° In truth, when
individual rights are taken seriously, problems of application
are probably unavoidable for reasons which go well beyond the
scope of this presentation, but history has shown that the Aus-
tinian alternative is not superior.
Beginning in the 1970s, when the doctrine of substantive due
process was rehabilitated by such writers as Gerald Gunther 2 1
and Lawrence Tribe,2 the positions of those on the left and
those on the right had reversed. Modern liberals now use sub-
stantive due process and the language of "entitlement" to pro-
tect certain basic personal (as opposed to economic) liberties
and to defend the welfare and regulatory state from the power-
ful intellectual (and popular) assault that classical liberals and
conservatives have developed in recent years. 23 Ironically,
many of those on the right who reject much of the so-called
"progressivism" of the New Deal now accept the legal positivist
Austinian constitutional theory that was used to bring the wel-
fare and regulatory state into existence. 4
18. John Austin was a close associate of both Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. The
University of London, where he was made the first Professor of Jurisprudence, was
founded by the Benthamites in 1826. See Urmson, supra note 3, at 209.
19. See e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding the
internment of citizens ofJapanese descent).
20. This view of the "internal erosion" of substantive due process is described in L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 442-46 (1978).
21. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 570-646 (10th ed. 1975).
22. See L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 1137-46.
23. I briefly chronicle this shift in Barnett, supra note 1, at 1225-36.
24. This ironic and largely unrecognized development has been recently docu-
mented in S. MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUION (1986). Professor
Macedo persuasively argues that, for all their talk of morality, many judicial conserva-
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IV. FREEDOM OF AssocIA ON
We must now examine how the Lockean-Austinian debate
applies to freedom of association. The freedom to associate
with persons of one's choice, which also includes the freedom
to refuse to associate, is a basic component of the freedom to
order one's own life that natural rights protect. If one takes a
strictly Austinian or positivist view of the Constitution, how-
ever, how are such freedoms to be protected from legislative
encroachment? The answer is that a court must either find
some enumerated Constitutional right (or at least a "penum-
bra" of or "emination" from an enumerated right) or forever
hold its peace.
But what enumerated right protects the freedom of associa-
tion? In three well-known cases, NAACP v. Button,25 Buckley v.
Valeo, 26 and Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee,27
the Supreme Court held that the legislative restrictions on as-
sociation in question threatened the enumerated First Amend-
ment right of free speech, but the recent case of Roberts v.
United States Jaycees2s could not be similarly resolved. In that
case, the National Jaycees, a purely nongovernmental associa-
tion, had excluded women from its membership. Finding that
the Jaycees engaged in little, if any, constitutionally protected
speech (a trait that the Jaycees would share with many private
associations), the Court concluded that application of a Minne-
sota statute against sex discrimination did not jeopardize the
enumerated constitutional right of free speech and therefore
was constitutionaly permissible. A similar stature has been held
to apply to the Boy Scouts29 and to the Boys Clubs. 0
tives are moral "subjectivists." Believing that moral claims have no objective or ra-
tional basis, but are instead merely subjective and essentially arbitrary "preferences,"
they resort to sheer majoritarianism (exerted through legislatures) to determine right.
In this way Professor Macedo is able to account for some judicial conservatives' seem-
ingly contradictory stance of "strictly construing" individual rights according to Eight-
eenth Century opinion, while broadly construing the extent of governmental powers by
standards we have grown accustomed to only in the last four decades of the Twentieth
Century. As Macedo notes, however, sheer majoritarianism is sharply at odds with both
the structure of the American Constitution and the beliefs and intentions of its
Framers.
25. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
26. 424 U.S. 1 (1982).
27. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
28. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
29. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712,
195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 3574 (1984).
30. See Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal.
Barnett
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Assuming they could have imagined these cases, is there any
doubt that the Founders would likely have abhorred such gov-
ernmental interference with a private association? Yet advo-
cates of "strict constructivism" or 'judicial restraint" or "what-
have-you philosophy" (to again borrow Judge Bork's felicitous
phrase 1), would be forced to urge the Supreme Court of the
United States to supinely countenance this kind of legislative
usurpation of associational freedom. There is, however, an
alternative.
V. Two KINDS OF JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
A Lockean approach to the Constitution considers two types
of rights as capable of overriding legislation. The first is the
institutional rights that the constitutional framework explicitly
provides to protect the individual from the government it es-
tablished. The second type of right is the background rights that
each person has by virtue of being a human being living in soci-
ety with others.32 Government is thought to be necessary to
protect both types of rights.
One way to understand this distinction is to imagine that the
Constitution is a script for governmental "players" who must
play the roles of the "characters" it provides. While some up-
dating of the play may occasionally be needed so that its origi-
nal meaning is preserved for contemporary audiences, no
player can simply make up his own lines. According to this
analogy, the constitutional allocation and limitation of powers
defines the relationship of the various "branches" and "levels"
of government in the way a script defines the relationship of
stage players to each other.
Continuing the analogy, what happens if an actor strikes out
at a member of the audience? The rights of the people in the
audience are two-fold. Against each other and against the play-
ers, they have background "private law" rights that judges have
been developing for centuries as part of the Anglo-American
Rptr. 150 (1984) (relying on Roberts).
31. See R. BORK, supra note 9, and accompanying text.
32. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrs SERIOUSLY 101-05 (1977) (conceptually distin-
guishing between background and institutional rights). Such a distinction is widely em-
ployed, though not always explicitly recognized. For example, opponents of abortion
typically favor an alleged (background) right of the fetus to life over an alleged consti-
tutional (institutional) right of the mother to privacy. And they would be unswayed in
their assertion of these rights by majoritarian legislation endorsing the legality of
abortion.
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common law. Against the players alone they may have additional
enumerated "public law" or institutional rights, such as'a right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, provided
by the Constitution. 3
Do we have a right to "freedom of association" and, if so, is
it an institutional right, a background right, or both? It is not
too difficult to find an institutional right of associational free-
dom based in the First Amendment's explicit guaranty of free
speech, as the Court held in the Button, Buckley, and Brown deci-
sions mentioned earlier. While this institutional right probably
does fall short of protecting the associational freedom of the
Jaycees (or the Boy Scouts or the Boys' Clubs), at least if the
Court's characterization of the Jaycees's activities is accurate, a
Lockean analysis would not end here.
A Lockean approach proceeds to identify more fundamental
background rights that do not evaporate upon the creation of a
government or the expression of majority will. Locke called
these rights "property rights;" that is, rights to acquire, use,
and transfer ownership of resources in the world. Such rights
are a principal means by which life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness are facilitated in a social context.34 Such rights in-
clude not only the right to external resources but also the right
to one's person.3 5
It is, then, plausible to claim that the application of the stat-
ute in Roberts violates the background property rights of the in-
dividuals comprising the National Jaycees. Just as you need not
associate with someone who knocks on your door and desires
to enter, persons who form associations such as the National
Jaycees, the Boy Scouts, or the Boys' Clubs by expending their
own rightfully and privately acquired resources on these non-
governmental activities need not admit into these activities per-
sons with whom they do not wish to associate. While we may
not have a background right of associational freedom per se,
33. I discuss the variable content of the private law-public law distinction in Barnett,
Foreword. Four Senses of Public Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267
(1986).
34. I explain this view of rights in Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part One-
Power v. Liberty, GRIM. JUST. ETmcs, Summer/Fall 1985, at 50.
35. SeeJ. LoCKE, supra note 4, § 27, at 328 ("every man has a 'property' in his own
'person' ").
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associational freedom is an important aspect of the background
property rights we do have.36
The only obstacle remaining in the path ofjudicial interven-
tion on behalf of the Jaycees is to justify federal judicial inter-
ference with a state legislative act. The Fourteenth Amendment
permits such an intervention when a state deprives a citizen of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" or when
it abridges "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States.""7 To strike down a legislative infringement of
Lockean background property rights, a court need not incor-
porate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment or
find "eminations" and "penumbras." A proper substantive the-
ory of "due process of law" and "privileges and immunities"
would support federal protection of the property rights of the
Jaycees."8 After all, the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact
Mr. Jeremy Bentham's Anarchical Fallacies.
VI. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
At this point, many readers may be thinking: Wait a minutel
Call it "legal positivism," or the "Austinian Constitution," or
"government first-rights second," or whatever you like. I still
want to know what gives an unelected federal judge with life-
time tenure the right to thwart the will of a popularly elected
legislature in the absence of an expressed constitutional au-
thorization. Fortunately, to answer this question, we need not
rely solely on John Locke or even on Robert Nozick. The an-
swer is contained within the Constitution itself: "The enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple." 9 Notice that the Ninth Amendment speaks of other rights
which are "retained by the people." I submit that such a phrase
would be completely inexplicable to the Nineteenth Century
"government first-rights second" philosophy of John Austin,
Jeremy Benthem, or Justice Holmes. This statement would
36. By granting review in Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Du-
arte, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, appeal granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S.
Sept. 30, 1986) (86-421), a case that relied on Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 104 S.
Ct. 3233 (1984) in rejecting Rotary International's constitutional claims, the Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to reconsider its position.
37. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. See also, infra note 44.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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have been viewed by them as "nonsense on stilts," yet the
Framers thought it important enough to include in the
Constitution.40
Some of the Framers and members of the ratifying conven-
tions realized that simply enumerating the powers of the fed-
eral government would not be enough to prevent the federal
scheme of government from violating the individual rights it
was created to protect.4 ' They believed that future generations
might construe the rights of individuals too narrowly.42 They
therefore inserted, among other clauses, an amendment refer-
ring to "the rights retained by the people" as a way of authoriz-
ing the enforcement of a Lockean vision of "rights first-
government second."'43 If this interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment is correct, associational freedom can be viewed as
an important aspect of the fundamental background rights that
it protects.4 4 If this interpretation is incorrect, then what else
can this explicit passage in the historical Constitution mean? It
is very hard to believe that the Framers intended to insert in
their Constitution an amendment that meant nothing at all.45
Surely it is disingenuous to claim to be interested in the
Framer's original intent and then to read this amendment out
of the Constitution simply because it does not harmonize with
the received view of contemporary utilitarian and analytic phi-
40. I do not wish to imply that this is the only textual support for background prop-
erty rights in the Constitution. For a considerably richer account of the text and its
relationship to private property see R. EPSTEIN, TAXINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EMl-
NENT DOMAIN (1985); and S. MACEDO, supra note 24. This language is, however, virtu-
ally inexplicable by any theory that rejects entirely any sort of natural rights position.
Far from being an obscure phrase buried within the document, it constitutes an entire
amendment.
41. See J. STORING, supra note 8, at 64-70; B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTrEN NINTH
AMENDMENT 6-9 (1955).
42. J. STORING, supra note 8, at 68-70.
43. B. PATrERSON, supra note 41, at 10-26.
44. Further, the legal protection afforded by the Ninth Amendment applies to the
States as well as the federal government without recourse to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See id. at 36-43.
45. In case anyone should think that I am criticizing a straw man here, I offer the
following anecdote. At the "Symposium on the First Amendment" held at Stanford
Law School in March 1986 where this Paper was delivered, Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge (and former University of Chicago law professor) Frank Easterbrook
took a positivist and narrow view of associational freedom in his paper. See Easter-
brook, Implicit and Explicit Rights ofAssociation, 10 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (1987) (argu-
ing that, absent a theory similar to substantive due process, the free speech clause of
the First Amendment would not protect associational activities like those of the Na-
tional Jaycees). During the question session that followed the delivery of our papers,
Judge Easterbrook was asked what he thought the Ninth Amendment meant. His initial
response was: "Nothingl"
No. 1] Barnett
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losophy. The longstanding effort to render this explicit passage
meaningless confirms the foresight of those Framers who were
not content to let the future of liberty rest entirely on the
enumeration of governmental powers.46
VII. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL AcnvISM AND
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Many of those who abhor the thought of judges enforcing
rights that have not been legislatively determined and who
characterize such a practice as "judicial activism" or "judicial
supremacy" are correctly concerned with the issue of judicial
authority. The question posed earlier: "What gives unelected
(or even elected) judges the right to determine individual
rights?" is a central question ofjurisprudence. Similarly, how-
ever, one must ask what gives the majority of the members of a
legislature, each of whom was elected by a simple majority of
the voters in a single election, the exclusive right to determine
individual rights? It is illegitimate for a judicial conservative to
ask one question without attempting to answer the other.
The answer to both questions suggested by a natural rights
analysis is that judges (and legislatures) have genuine authority
only to the extent their decisions are consonant with the back-
ground and institutional rights that individuals have. Constitu-
tions obtain their authority in no other manner. The American
Consitution is authoritative (if it is4 7), not because it was writ-
ten by the right group of now deceased thinkers and activists,
but because this particular group of thinkers and activists got it
generally right. After all, even Bentham's Anarchical Fallacies
was an attack on the merits of, not the pedigree of, The Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,48 which had been
adopted by the French Constituent Assembly on August 27,
1789.4 9 Bentham did not argue that the document lacked au-
thority because it was improperly enacted. Rather, he main-
tained that the French framers got it wrong.
46. The proper meaning and use of the Ninth Amendment is a topic that merits
further discussion.
47. This aspect of our received wisdom was challenged in L. SPOONER, No TREASON:
THE CoNSTrruON OF No Au-rIORrry (1869).
48. The original title of his essay was Anarchical Fallacies; being an Examination of the
Declaration of Rights issued during the French Revolution. See Monroe, Jeremy Bentham, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 284 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
49. SeeJ. SCHAPIRO, LIBERALISM: ITS MEANING AND HISTORY 128 (1958).
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This gives rise to the knotty problem of determining what
the so-called individual rights are, a question that I have dealt
with elsewhere,5" as have others. 51 Absent a complete aban-
donment of rational moral discourse, however, no competing
theory can avoid this problem either. For example, by what rea-
son beyond sheer power does the majority of the citizenry gain
the right to coerce a dissenting minority? If the proposed basis
of legislative authority is "utilitarian," how and by whom is this
utility to be conceived and computed? If legislative authority is
alleged to be based on "harmony with biblical scripture," then
a host of similar interpretive questions are still raised.
Any moral position short of "might makes right" must grap-
ple with such issues, and the "might makes right" view, which
amounts to the view that there is no right,5 2 gives rise to its
own special difficulties. There is simply no escaping the hard
questions. All we can do is the best we can to reason our way to
answers. Indeed we are obliged to do no less.
Many conservatives today shy away from all talk of entitle-
ments.53 By doing so they are yielding the moral high ground
to those who oppose many of our most basic and traditional
rights. Of course, an open debate about fundamental rights
creates a risk that misconceived rights will be enforced, and this
has certainly occurred. The dangers of permitting "rights talk"
by judges, however, is greatly exaggerated. Judges have been
developing a system of private legal rights for centuries. It is
called the "common law." And where judges have recently
50. See Barnett, supra note 34; Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269 (1986); Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn
1986, at 179; Barnett, Why We Need Legal Philosophy, 8 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1985);
Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHics 279 (1977); Barnett,
The Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 117 (1980); Barnett, Public Decisions and Private
Rights (Book Review), CRIM. JUST. ETHIcs, Summer/Fall, 1984, at 50.
51. See e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 40; R. NoZICK, supra note 5; H. VEATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS: FACr OR FANCY? (1986).
52. For a discussion of constituional analysts who appear to hold such a view, see S.
MACEDO, supra note 24.
53. See e.g., Scalia, EconomicAffairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATOJ. 703, 707 (1985) ("con-
servatives who have been criticizing the courts in recent years .... must decide whether
they really believe ... that the courts are doing too much, or whether they are actually
nursing only the less principled grievance that the courts have not been doing what they
want."). For a response defending a principled activism, see Epstein, Judicial Review:
Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J. 711, 712 (1985) ("The constitutionality of
legislation restricting economic liberties cannot be decided solely by appealing to an
initial presumption in favor ofjudicial restraint. Instead, the imperfections of the judi-
cial system must be matched with the imperfections of the political branches of
government.").
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gone wrong in the area of constitutional rights, they have done
so largely for two reasons.
First, some of the fault for judicial activism lies squarely at
the door of Congress and the political system. Many of the
"rights" judges have "created" have been based on vaguely
worded acts of Congress that were passed in response to a sup-
posed public "will" to "do something" about a real or
imagined social problem,54 with the effect being that the bur-
den for determining the actual content of the legislation is
shifted to others. Sometimes this means that regulatory agen-
cies create the rules. Often legislative language gives judges lit-
tle choice but to define rights ab initio as best they can. 55
Second, much of the fault for creating objectionable rights
lies with the intellectual community, which has persistently ig-
nored or ridiculed the distinction between "positive" and
"negative" rights.56 There is certainly far less danger of the
kind of abuse conservatives decry when courts strike down leg-
islation as beyond what government may rightfully do to an in-
dividual, than when a judge can create a governmental
obligation to do somethingfor an individual. While such a dis-
tinction may not in practice always be clear, it is at least as
workable as many other legal distinctions courts routinely em-
ploy. It is the will, not the way, to protect negative rights and
eschew positive rights that is lacking.
In the final analysis, the abandonment of all discussion of in-
dividual rights in the name of philosophical neutrality (or sub-
jectivism or skepticism) is tantamount to unilateral intellectual
disarmament in favor of those who would deny the rights which
secure and define our precious liberty. It virtually assures that
these economic and personal rights will be violated, if not
54. Consider, for example, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(halting construction of a multi-million dollar dam to prevent the destruction of the
snail darter fish).
55. In Tennessee Valley Authority, the statute in question required all agencies and de-
partments of the federal govenment to take "such action necessary to insure that ac-
tions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species." The Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1982)). It
should surprise no one that many judges will try to interpret such language when it is
cited by a party as authority and will occasionally create absurd "rights." Does not the
real fault lie with the members of Congress who for purely political purposes authored
or voted for legislation containing such meaningless empowering language?
56. See H. VFATcH, supra note 50, at 177-97 (discussing the nature and basis for such
a distinction).
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under the rubric of "rights," then under the rubric of majority
or community "will." Moreover, such a posture is not only
doomed to failure, it is contrary to the original intent of the
Framers of the historical Constitution.
